THE POLITICS
OF REPRESENTATION

Some Native Canadian Women Writers

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NATIVE CANADIAN CULTURE had never before received such
great public attention as it did in Toronto in the spring of 1989.¹ At the Theatre Passe
Muraille, Dry Lips Oughta Go to Kapuskasing, the latest play by Manitoba Cree
Tomson Highway, played to packed houses and critical acclaim. Like its comple-
ment, The Rez Sisters (1986-87), which also — though from women’s perspectives
— explored Reserve life, the traditional culture of the trickster, and gender politics,
Dry Lips won the annual Dora award for the best production on the Toronto stage.
Incidentally, this was Highway’s third play to première in Toronto this year, The
Sage, the Fool and the Dancer having played to equally full houses at the Native
Centre in February. A play for young people had more limited exposure at a branch
of the Toronto Public Library during National Book Week. Over at the Cumber-
land, the audience mixed in the lobby to see Gary Farmer in another leading role,
a fine comic performance by this Mohawk actor from the Six Nations Reserve near
Brantford, in Powwow Highway, the latest version of the on-the-road-quest —
Native style. There was a strong Native presence in the visual arts as well. Rebecca
Belmore’s (Ojibwa) “Ihkewak ka-ayamiwhat: Means Women Who are Speak-
ing” was featured in the issue of Parallelogramme that reproduced the texts from
the 1987 exhibition, “Locations: Feminism, Art, Racism, Region — Writings and
Artworks.” This was a prelude to her summer appearance in the Harbourfront
show of “Contemporary Art By Women of Native Ancestry,” which followed an
exhibit of art by the First Nations and “Indian Territory,” the work of Ed Poitras
at Powerplant.³

Later in May, Native Earth Performing Arts invited everyone back to the Passe
Muraille for “Weegageechak Begins to Dance,” a festival showcasing Native plays
and playwrights including, among others, Deep Shit City, a new text by playwright
Daniel David Moses (Mohawk), and Princess Pocahontas & the Blue Spots by the
gifted actress and performance artist Monique Mojica.⁴ Soon after, poet Alanis
Obamsawin’s (Abenaki) new film, No Address, was among those featured on the
opening weekend of the Euclid Cinema established by DEC to screen politically engaged films. For many of the writers, these events climaxed a season of intensive workshops in Native cultural production organized by the Committee to Re-establish the Trickster. The publication of the first number of *The Trickster* has in itself been an augury, a testimony to the variety and vitality, the quantity and quality, of cultural productions by Native artists. All signs would seem to herald the emergence of Native culture as a forceful presence in the literary institution.

Inscribing this cultural activity under the sign of *The Trickster* indexes the ambiguities of this interruption, however. Like the many manifestations of this cultural divinity, Native culture is both destructive and creative, Coyote's "double hook" of darkness and light. Participants in the creative workshops run by *The Trickster* would focus on reviving traditional storytelling techniques in new forms. Under David MacLean's guidance, storytelling for "television" explored the "creation of new conventions" as, indeed, would the workshops under Highway on "Storytelling for the Stage" while that on "Adapting Storytelling for the Written Page" promised to intensively explore the oral traditions and why they should be translated into written genres. Such intersemiotic "translation" will inevitably work upon them, dis/placing and hybridizing conventions. More explicitly enunciated in a workshop under the direction of poet Lenore Keeshig-Tobias (Ojibwa) entitled "Re-establishing the Voice: Oral and Written Literature into Performance," was the kind of challenge to the Canadian literary institution posed by this emergent literature: it posits the word as a process of knowing, provisional and partial, rather than as revealed knowledge itself, and aims to produce texts in performance that would create truth as interpretation rather than those in the Western mimetic tradition that reveal truth as pre-established knowledge.

Challenge to the Canadian literary tradition was overtly signalled in two of the sessions organized by Keeshig-Tobias and Daniel David Moses. The one entitled "The Missing Voice in Canadian Literature" proposed an "alternative orientation to the study of Canadian Literature" and looked at the role of Native metaphors and Tricksters. Framed in this way, however, it drew attention to the absence of Native texts in the Canadian canon and advanced an alternate canon from what has been an "invisible" visible minority. In this, it contests the claims to comprehension and universality of "Canadian Literature," in the spirit of an aesthetic of difference, where Native cultural producers join the denunciation of the politics of the canon by a number of others in favour of greater recognition of the differentiation of a variety of groups whose race, ethnicity, gender, or class has hitherto marginalized them in the literary field. In this challenge, however, the Native writer is situating herself or himself not just as the Other, an author of radically different texts from an entirely different mode of production. Those following *The Trickster* constitute a contestatory discourse that positions itself as a literature of resistance within the conventions, though marginally so, of the dominant discourse. The final
workshop aimed to confront directly the question of cultural appropriation, the strategies whereby Native creative productions have been marginalized by the literary institution. As its particular focus it took the issue of intellectual property exploring the different concepts of property in Native and mainstream cultures—anonymous communal texts versus signed texts—in a seminar with the resonant title "Whose Story is it Anyway?"

As this title announces, questions of property are imbricated in issues of the proper name and of propriety, of those tangled concepts of the authorial signature, of authority, and of decorum or convention, both social and literary. Who has the right to speak or write? What are the appropriate forms for their utterance to take? These, as Michel Foucault has taught us, are the important questions to ask in order to unravel the knotted interconnections of knowledge and power: who is speaking, to whom, on whose behalf, in what context? The ideological significance of conventions is part of that "political unconscious" of literature analyzed by Fredric Jameson. As he writes: "genres are essentially literary institutions, or social contracts between a writer and a specific public, whose function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact." The relation between texts and institutions is emerging as the common project of the humanities and the social sciences, according to Dominick La Capra. Genres and intellectual disciplines—discursive practices all—determine through their constraints the specific language uses of texts. "And discursive practices always have a significant relation to sociopolitical institutions—a relation that becomes obvious and subject to sanctions once intellectual pursuits are formally organized in institutionalized disciplines." Whether a perfection of a genre or a disconcerting text that rewrites a genre, texts test and contest the limits of a genre or discursive practice.

"Appropriate form" or appropriation? This is an issue of great contention within the Canadian literary institution at the moment and the intervention of the Trickster workshop was confrontational, strategically oppositional, a deliberate interruption of the canonical norm. Moreover, it occurred in the midst of an intense debate in the Toronto papers which indicated that the emergence of Native culture has been neither assured nor easy. What has been played out in the press, at the same time as this cultural flowering has been moving audiences in the theatre, has been an enactment of the systemic racism through which this cultural production has been rendered "invisible" over the years. The "strategies of reproduction"—the economic strategies that agents use to maintain or improve their social position, the conditions of access through education, affliative groups, etc.—whereby the literary institution reproduces itself in its existing norms and confers legitimacy on "authors" is exposed in this debate. Generally, such reproduction which is the work of institutions conveying "know-how," is to ensure the mastery of its "practice" and consequently "a reproduction of subjection to the ruling ideology," the repetition of the same.
This “reproduction of the relations of production” (128) is carried out through representations, whereby individuals are constituted as subjects in their imaginary relationships to their real conditions of existence, that is, in and through ideology. As Althusser reiterates, ideology always has a material existence in that it is a practice (155). Moreover, “there is no ideology except by and for subjects” (159), that is, ideology “constitutes concrete individuals as subjects” (160) through representations which offer subject-positions wherein the individual as subject is made to identify with the Subject of that specific institutional representation or discursive practice. In this case, the literary institution interpellates individuals with representations of the Author-function which subject-position individuals are invited to occupy. As Althusser points out, within a class society, relations of production are “relations of exploitation” between antagonistic groups. In the present instance of the Canadian literary institution, the relationships between ethnically different groups constitute agonistic relations within an apparatus of struggle ensuring the oppression of certain groups and guaranteeing the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction. That the literary institution and the representations through which it is reproduced are sites of struggle is, however, camouflaged in the narrative of the hegemonic discourse which affirms its authority monologically by refusing to engage in dialogue with these alternate discourses, refuses in fact to acknowledge their existence as contestatory practices and hence to legitimate them as interlocutors.

What is at stake in the struggle is the production of value under competing modes of production. What is that “good” book that merits publication and constructs the author as subject? The representations of the author-position offered by the dominant literary institution were challenged for their systemic racism at the 16th annual general meeting of the Writers’ Union of Canada (Waterloo, May 1989). Racism in writing was the subject of a panel discussion which involved McClelland & Stewart publisher Douglas Gibson and Lenore Keeshig-Tobias. The narratives of this encounter differ according to the narrator and his or her representations of the debate. In one account, Sheelagh Conway, dissident feminist writer, quotes Keeshig-Tobias in support of her view that the Canadian literary institution determines value (i.e., literary “quality”) according to the “values of Canada’s male-dominant, middle-class white culture. Anything else is viewed as ancillary or, at worst, an aberration.”

Publishers say they are interested in “quality” work, not an author’s gender or race. . . . Juxtapose sexism with racism and the problem is compounded. Makeda Silvera, co-founder of Sister Vision, Canada’s only press for women of color, estimates that fewer than 1 per cent of such writers are published because Canadian publishers are unwilling to understand or acknowledge Canada’s divers cultures. Leonore Keeshig-Tobias, a native writer, says publishers have returned manuscripts.
submitted by natives with “too Indian” or “not Indian enough” scrawled across them. (Conway)

This editorial practice, wherein a “good” book is an ideologically correct book and the author-position is determined by racist norms, is corroborated by Marlene Nourbese Philip, a Toronto black woman writer, who describes the publication history of her prize-winning novel, *Harriet’s Daughter*, as it was rejected by Toronto publishers using similar phrases. “Not marketable” was a “euphemism for their concern about the race of the characters.” Only after a British editor agreed to publish it did Women’s Press bring out a Canadian co-edition.13

Once published, books must still find their way to reviewers and readers. Most of the publications of writers of “visible” racial minorities are the work of publishers themselves marginal to the literary institution. That this relationship is ideological, an oppressive relationship, is suggested by the relative fortunes of two women’s presses in obtaining the University of Toronto Press as agent for distribution. Second Story Press, a new feminist press run by white women born of the split at Women’s Press over this very issue of racism, though it has yet to produce any books, has been signed on by the prestigious university press on the strength of the editors’ reputation14 while Williams-Wallace, another small press which publishes literary manuscripts by women and writers of racial and ethnic minorities, despite a most respectable back list of writers like Dionne Brand, Claire Harris, and Nourbese Philip, could not obtain this agency service.15

The other narrative in *The Globe and Mail* also characterizes the encounter as a dialogue of the deaf, representing it, though, not as a site of struggle but as theatre of the absurd. It is not my intention to abuse *The Globe and Mail*, but it advertises itself as Canada’s only “national” newspaper. Given these claims to universality, its literary pronouncements function as canonical fiats. It is these claims to speak for “everyone” which constitute the monologic discourse of hegemonic formations and which must be interrogated for their politics of inclusion. In this second narrative, Gibson and Keesig-Tobias “address[ed] the same issue without ever talking about the same things; they barely seemed to be addressing each other.”16

It was hard to say which was the more outrageous, Keesig-Tobias’s claim that non-native writers should not tell native stories or Gibson’s unequivocal statement that there is no racism in Canadian publishing. (It should be added, by the way, that Keesig-Tobias’s recollections of native-produced manuscripts being rejected and heavily edited by mainstream publishers cut little ice with a roomful of writers, few of whom are strangers to either rejection or editing.)

In his article, Kirchhoff frames this stychomythia with an account of the defeat of Judith Merril’s motion proposing a task force to examine the relationship of cultural minorities to the Canadian publishing industry, defeated because it seemed “patronizing,” according to one East Indian-born writer, and to bear little relation to the bread and butter issues proper to the activities of a trade union in the eyes of the
majority. As Kirchhoff suggests: “The matters of race did not detract noticeably from the other business of the AGM, such as reports from the regional committees, plans to get more Canadian literature into Canadian schools, discussions of contracts and copyrights, and the status of the Public Lending Right program.” That this business-as-usual attitude was itself a manifestation of systemic racism, an example of the trivialization and blindness that renders invisible the demands of the minority, for whom this question of access to the editor’s approval, this mark of value, is indeed a vital bread and butter issue — the one without which contracts are phantasmagoric — is made clear in the rest of the article. Under the guise of the seemingly neutral prose of the reporter stating the facts, Kirchhoff re-marks in his parentheses and asides the profound racism of Canadian society which is manifest in its jokes that make fun of the very fact of racism and so conceal the work of reproduction of this racist mode of production within the institution. This is the key tactic of ideology, as Earthes understands it, the naturalization of belief as fact, the presentation as that which goes without saying, as a system of facts, what is in actuality a semiological system, that is a system of values.

The jokes of the union members offer representations of “colour” which Kirchhoff reports — and supports — that serve to efface the different hues of skin, colour which marks permanent differences among people, in favour of differences in the colours of clothes worn by individuals, a mere surface difference of choice and costume. These jokes turn the protestations of racism by writers of visible minorities into the games of the clown, laughable, and hence, no threat to the majority. As Kirchhoff compounds the racism of his reportage: “None of this was malicious, but it was always there.” The failure to treat another’s claims seriously as those of an equal is the strategy of the oppressor who hereby denies value and subjectivity to the other. In these jokes, the person of colour is cast as an object of amusement for the white person who alone is constituted as author-subject in these representations.

In this article, there is also a report of a quarrel between a B.C. writer working on a novel set in the Queen Charlotte Islands and the Haida who refused him authorization to visit their land without him according them the reciprocal right to vet what he should write about them. This is the other facet of this question of the political struggle over representation, over who has the right to speak and what is the appropriate form for this utterance to take. This question of the right to represent individuals or topics belonging to a minority culture has been a contentious issue in Canadian literary circles in the last year. It was over just this problem that Women’s Press in Toronto split into two groups over an anthology which included narratives about minority groups (Indians of South America) written by white Canadian women. What emerged as the group in control defined racism as the use by a member of a dominant group of the experience of a disadvantaged culture or the use of culturally-laden devalued language as, for example, the term “black” in a negative context. This attempt to formulate an anti-racist policy, one which
moved beyond a liberal non-racist policy based on rejecting overt discriminatory remarks to develop a more systemic analysis of racism, did not, however, entail an affirmative action policy for promoting the self-representations of women of visible minorities. Moreover, the nostalgia for purity, as we shall see, inverted the reigning discourse but did nothing to challenge its values nor the fact of hierarchization itself. It was a call by Keeshig-Tobias for an affirmative action policy with regards to Native writers that was dismissed by Kirchhoff as “outrageous” and subversive of the existing political arrangements.

This was not a startlingly new claim by Keeshig-Tobias. It has been reiterated on many occasions by women of colour, most pointedly in the introduction to a special issue of *Fireweed* wherein the guest editors speak of the difficulty they experience in having their work published because they are not “saying it right” according to the norms of the dominant culture. “[S]o if you don’t fit into that [one way of ‘saying’ that counts], then as far as they’re concerned, you’re not saying anything.” For Native women this poses a particular difficulty since “the princess” and “the squaw” constitute the semiotic valences within which Native women have long been represented in the dominant literature of North America. In the allegories of empire, the Indian Queen figured in the celebrated “Four Continents” illustrations of the early sixteenth century as the “familiar Mother-Goddess figure, full-bodied, powerful, nurturing but dangerous — embodying the wealth and danger of the New World.” Her daughter, the Princess, as Britannia’s daughter, the Carib Queen, or the Statue of Liberty, leaner and more Caucasian, figures in the allegories of nationalism as the colonies move towards independence. In these configurations, the Native woman as sign was called on to represent both American liberty and European classical virtue. But in a semiotic field configured through relations of substitution, as well as those of contiguity, the Native woman also figured all that was different from the Queen. As the savage Squaw, she configured the dark side of the Mother-Queen, the witch-healer medicine woman, the seductive whore, the drunken, stupid, thieving Natives living in shacks on the edge of town, not in a woodland paradise (Greene 21). No Roman sandals grace her feet; her complexion is dark and primitive. She is the despised object of conquest. That an “image of the squaw” produced by the dominant culture would become a literary norm that would determine the value of all subsequent cultural productions by Native women which would be measured against it, is a fear expressed by Native writers Beth Cuthand, Jeannette Armstrong, and Maria Campbell, who see in the strong interest white women writers have expressed in their culture, the mechanism whereby their self-representations will be excluded from the literary institution. Within the semiotic field of the Native, these representations constitute one valence in relation to the white women’s long expressed dream of “going squaw.”

That this exclusion has already happened, however, has also been demonstrated. One of the high canonical forms of Canadian fiction is the vision quest, or shamanic
initiation, wherein the Native woman (or man) initiates a white woman into various Native religious practices through which she attains her creative and personal “identity.” Here the Native woman is configured as Queen, as Mother-Goddess, fount of all wisdom and ruler of a natural paradise. This has resulted in a vogue within feminist circles for narratives of women’s spiritual transformation, fiction in the form of the vision quest of romance using all the fictional devices of reference to produce a strong effect of the real in the form of a fully psychologized heroine seeking freedom from patriarchy in the “green world.”

In contrast, Native women’s narratives have adopted entirely different formal strategies, discontinuous tales rather than coherently plotted quests, symbolic events rather than psychologized reactions. Moreover, they write miscellanies—hybrid genres—mixtures of sermons, narratives, poetry, ethnographical treatises.

A number of recent essays have analyzed the “imaginary Indian,” the Native as sign within Canadian discourse, an empty sign and consequently weighed down with what Gordon Johnston terms “an intolerable burden of meaning” (King 65) in that the Native has come to bear the burden of the Other, all that the modern white person is lacking. Identity for this white person is acquired through this encounter with alterity, knowledge of the self attained through the wisdom of the not-I, an identity both personal and national. For it is through this encounter with the Other who is Native to this land, that a “totem transfer” occurs and the stranger in North America “goes native” to possess the land, to be Native. Conveniently, as Margery Fee points out, this figure of mediation, the token or empty sign in the discourse between white men, that is, the Native, dies or disappears (King 20-21). This leaves the white man in undisputed possession of the land: “The simultaneous marginality and ubiquity of the Native people in our literature can be explained to some extent, then, by our desire to naturalize our appropriation of their land.”

This impossible necessity for incorporating the Other, for becoming indigenous in order to belong in the land they have conquered, has been termed the process of “indigenization” by Terry Goldie, who articulates the valences of the semiotic field for this transference of the desiring subject, those of fear and temptation, which encompass a gamut of codes: those of orality, mysticism, soul, nature, violence, sexuality, etc. (Goldie, in King 67-79, especially 73).

Despite the critique of Native women writers and the recent attempts at demystification by scholars of Canadian literature, the Native woman has maintained her mythical status within the dominant culture. Indeed, she even seems to be consolidating it in collaboration with the Writers’ Union and in explicit opposition to the denunciations of such a practice as “structurally racist.” I refer here specifi-
cally to the new novel *Bone Bird* by Darlene Barry Quaife and the writer's description/defence of her project in an interview. Under the heading “Celebrating Native Spirituality: Writer feels society can learn from native ways,” Quaife argues that writing about different cultures is the work of the imagination and that any attempt to limit this freedom is an act of censorship and the promotion of racism. The novel she is defending in these familiar terms of the esemplastic power of a disembodied imagination, follows the highly conventional plot of the “coming of age” of a Métis woman on Vancouver Island through the influence of her grandmother, “a native medicine woman, who is the spiritual centre of the book.” Quaife pictures herself as a missionary to her readers, desiring to share with them the “sense of spirituality” that white culture has lost but which she has found in her research into shamanism. In this, Quaife reiterates all the codes of indigenization: lack, desire, mystical purity, possession. All the while she maintains the benevolence of her appropriation which is ‘for the good of the Natives.’

What’s important is how a writer approaches their material. I didn’t approach *Bone Bird* with the idea of exploitation. I wanted to celebrate what I have learned with my readership. I wanted to open up the audiences for native writers.

She continues, ironically contradicting herself and thus demonstrating the constraints of discursive conventions in this ideological production of representations:

I wanted to be accurate, but not record native spirituality. I wanted to make it my own because what’s important is the synthesis — the writer creating the myth.

If I had come to the material with the idea of exploitation, then I would deserve to be censored, she said. (my emphasis)

Intention is ineffective in the face of discursive practice, however. Though Quaife is seemingly innocent (ignorant) of them, she faithfully manipulates the conventions of “indigenization,” though camouflaging their normative and exclusive character behind Romantic appeals to the originality of the artist and the freedom of imagination which are decontextualized and universalized, “mythologized,” hence ideological, according to Barthes. Quaife’s desire to help Native culture find expression is meaningless in face of her blindness to the context of her utterance at the present point in history where the Native peoples in Canada are forcefully calling for an end to benevolent paternalism and colonialism and the settlement of their land claims, the acknowledgement of their ancient rights to the possession of the land. In this enunciative instance, Quaife’s desire to “make [native spirituality] my own” by “creating myth” is, in its denial of history, an exemplary instance of the perpetuation of colonial exploitation. The grounds on which Quaife claims her authority to do so are the familiar liberal humanist grounds of our common humanity and consequent “empathy,” not an acknowledgement of the justice of the Natives’ struggle. For this would undermine the universality of “Truth.” As Quaife asserts, an emphasis on differences stirs up dissidence. The function of the writer
is to respond to the "shared view of the world" she has with the Natives. "After all, we all bleed the same colour." This indifference to the many socio-political differences with respect to their relative access to the literary institutions that separate her from the Native writers exemplifies the rhetorical violence with which the dominant discourse denies the legitimacy of the minority of conflating relations of ideological domination with those of economic exploitation.

The irony of Quaife's position is further compounded when she reveals that this spirituality she wishes to share is her imaginative re-creation: "In order to evoke a very vivid sense of spirituality and recreate native rituals, Quaife did a lot of research into shamanism. While she concedes that she fabricated most of the native rituals in the Bone Bird, she nevertheless believes that her interpretation of native spirituality is valid" (my emphasis). Valid, it most certainly is, since it reworks the codes of the discourse of British (and French) imperialism and the Canadian development of this discourse as indigenization, and finds its validation in the literary institution as demonstrated in the action of the Writers' Union on the question of racism. Since it has numerous literary antecedents, it must also be true as revealed knowledge grounded in the authority of the text and the Word. But is it real?

This too is a moot point, since reality is determined by its representations and they are signifying systems, sites not for the production of beautiful things evoking beautiful feelings, but for the production of meanings and positions from which those meanings are consumed, meanings that are defined in a hierarchy systematically ordered within social formations between the dominant and dominated. These conflicts and contradictions are negotiated within social formations in which subjects are interpellated so that the cultural practices through which we make sense of the social process, and the means by which we are caught up and produced by it, are sites of struggle and confusion over partial and conditioned knowledges. The danger is when, like Quaife, we take our fabrications, our partial knowledges for the Truth, and generalize to make it a Truth-for-all. Such a speaking on behalf of, a magisterial discourse on another, effectively precludes the circulation of its different partial knowledges as interlocutors.

This struggle over the politics of representation on the issue of race is part of a much larger theoretical debate on relations of power to knowledge: can men theorize feminism, can the bourgeois theorize revolution? Because of the power alignments in the current discursive configuration, any statement of a white on the question of racism will be positioned by that discourse as an utterance on racism rather than as a contestatory utterance, because it perpetuates the discourse of white on red, or white on black, reinforcing the dominant discourse by blocking the emergence of an emancipatory discourse of/for red and/or black and/or brown, yellow, etc. Such discursive practices become oppressive when the group in power monopolizes the theoretical scene and there is no counter-discourse, that is no debate among
differing discourses. To claim that only a woman can write about women or a Native person about Native culture, is to make claims for essentialism that involve the confusion of an analogy between ontology and epistemology, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has pointed out (253). “Resisting ‘elite’ methodology for ‘subaltern’ material involves an epistemological/ontological confusion. The confusion is held in an unacknowledged analogy: just as the subaltern is not elite (ontology), so must the historian not know through elite method (epistemology).”

To maintain these essentialist positions with regards to race and knowledge is to maintain the dominant discourse, albeit in simple inversion, rather than to challenge or change its norms and practices. “If the woman/black/subaltern, possessed through struggle some of the structures previously metonymic as men/white/elite, continues to exercise a self-marginalized purism, and if the benevolent members of the man/white/elite participate in the marginalization and thus legitimate the bad old days, we have a caricature of correct politics that leaves alone the field of continuing subalternization” (253).

Underpinning this inversion is the recognition by the subaltern or dominated that his or her idiom within the dominant discursive formation has not allowed him or her to “know his struggle so that he [sic] could articulate himself as a subject” (253). Within this hegemonic order, s/he was constituted as object of the knowledge of subjects. However, through struggle, acquiring some of the strategies and structures of the dominant, the subaltern rises into hegemony, this process constituting a displacement of the dominant discourse and strategies of hybridization that undermine its monolithic position of power. Both speaking marginality and speaking against it, exploiting the ambiguity of their within/without position with respect to power, these emerging subjects destabilize institutional practices. That this is beginning to happen within the culture of Native Canadians is, as I shall argue, visible in the recent books *I Am Woman* by Lee Maracle and *Slash* by Jeannette Armstrong, both written from within the political activity of the Oka-nagans as they challenge dominant institutions and their representations of Native concerns.

While there are many continuities with the earlier cultural productions of Native women, notably in the strategic use of the miscellany, of traditional oral narrative forms, these texts contest their inscription within the symbolic position of mystical orality and Maternal spirituality of the dominant discourse by explicitly situating their texts discursively, as writing of resistance, and historically, within the project of the contemporary Indian movement. Moreover, they are located within new instances challenging the hegemony of the dominant literary institution, within publishing projects run by Natives to diffuse their self-representations. No longer locked into “silence” as a singular oral event or within the confines of a Native language, these texts in English take as their interlocutor the dominant tradition in a polemic which is overtly signalled within the texts. Moreover, although the
dominant discourse clearly reigns supreme, as witnessed by its deployment in support of systemic racism in *The Globe and Mail*, there is emerging in the interruptions of *The Trickster* and Lenore Keeshig-Tobias the beginning of a theorization of the marginalization of Native culture. The theory finds a more sustained development within the texts of Maracle and Armstrong which both extensively analyze the situation of the Native within the context of a politics of decolonization and demonstrate how marginality has been constructed by the hegemonic forces of imperialism and capitalism. But the emergence of this counter-discourse on internal colonialism as a contestatory politics of representation is signalled in the change of form developed by these writers, the romance vision quest of the dominant tradition into autobiographical and confessional modes respectively, as Maracle and Armstrong imitate — and displace — the dominant genres in which the "imaginary Native" has been represented. For critical here, is that these are pre-eminently "historical" narratives.

**Before analyzing these two texts** in more detail, there is an important question that needs to be explored: the power/knowledge nexus as articulated within different theoretical models of discursive formations. If the interpellative powers of representations and discourses are so coercive that one is always subject under the discursive norm, how can it be possible to elaborate alternate practices? How can the subject under the law become a resisting subject? Subjectivity as the subject-position within a discourse is synonymous with subjection, in Althusserian terms. In the clash of values which is played out as a clash of representations how can the totalizing force of power be circumscribed? Where is there a space for knowledges of oppressed minorities that make no claim to universality? The problematics of resisting subjects in subjection is a complex one involving considerations of the potentials for agency exercised within a situation of constraint and of the different models for conceptualizing the interaction of discourses. For this involves the pressing question of the relations between orthodoxy and heterodoxies in the interaction among the hegemonic culture(s) of dominant classes, popular culture(s), and high culture(s). Is the cultural field configured globally as successive levels in a hierarchy from dominant to subordinate classes, as a circulation of reciprocal influences between subordinate and ruling classes, or as cultural dichotomy with absolute autonomy between the cultures of dominant and subordinate cultures? Or, to phrase this problem in another way, how can what is positioned as object "inside" discourse take up a position as subject "outside" discourse? How can there be a position "outside" what is a hegemonic, and hence totalizing, field?
It is in such a double-bind, in such a self-contradictory and ambivalent instance of enunciation that the subordinate “subject” is positioned. But it is by exploring the fissures and cracks which paradox opens in the claims of the dominant discourse that an alternate logic may be constructed, a logic grounded not on the binary codes of the law of the excluded middle, but in the logics of relativity or catastrophe theory with their serial or multiple interactions, their theorizing of chaos. This will open up a view of discourse as a field of contesting knowledges rather than as monolithic, totalitarian imposition of the Law. The time has come, as Chandra Mohanty writes, “to move beyond the Marx who found it possible to say: They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.”

That one is never “outside” power, because it is “always already there,” does not entail the acceptance of inescapable domination of absolute privilege, maintains Foucault, whose model for analyzing the institutional operations of power in the constitution of knowledges has been a non-Marxist theorization of ideology dominant in literary studies. “To say that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matter what.” The response of oppressed groups to hegemonic culture is complex and frequently contradictory: accepted, forceably perhaps, in some ways, it is resisted in others. The hegemonic discourse itself may be “marked by tensions and even contradictions” (LaCapra 78). As Foucault conceptualizes the discursive field, it is structured through a number of systems of control and distribution that function as “discursive police” to exclude such contradictions. It is a “system of subjection,” characterized by its dissymmetry. Power functions within systems that produce polymorphous power-effects operative in micro-political climates. Each society, however, has a “general political economy” of truth, “that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, Power 130) that induce “effects of power.” Although he argues against a “binary structure” of “dominators” against “dominated” (Power 142), Foucault’s focus is on the strategies and techniques of exclusion through which discourses consolidate their power, rather than on the exploration of the conditions for the possible elaboration of new discursive formations. His theory of discourse has as its centre the workings of power, of the global economy — the “system of systems.”

Instead of locating resistance as merely a counter-effect of the networks of power, one may also begin to theorize from a situation of struggle, from the position of the subordinate engaged in lateral as well as vertical struggles. Michel Pêcheux develops the concept of discursive field and argues that no practice or discourse exists in itself; on whatever side, it is ultimately shaped and preceded by what it is opposing and so can never simply dictate its own terms. Meaning exists agonistically: it comes from positions in struggle so that “words . . . change their meaning according to the ‘positions’ from which they are used within the ‘discursive process.’” What is thought within one discourse is related to what is unthought there but thought
elsewhere in another. In this way, “red” means something different in the dominant discourse from what it does in the Native's discourse of resistance. Institutional and social constraints act through the ordering of words and expressions within discourses. What is at stake in discursive struggles is this ordering and combining of words.

Pêcheux focuses on the processes of imbrication of discourses, their embedding effects and articulations, the structure of “interdiscourse” (Pêcheux 113). Each discourse interpellates individuals as subjects of this discourse. But this subordination-subjection is realized in the subject “in the form of autonomy” (Pêcheux 114). The identification of the subject with him or herself, “the subject-effect,” is coeval with the “inter-subjectivity-effect,” an identification with the subject of another discourse (Pêcheux 118). There are no a priori dominant and revolutionary vectors. However, within a given ideological instance under given historical conditions these discursive formations are asymmetrically related to one another. They are, however, “sites of a work of reconfiguration” which may be, variously, a work of “recuperation-reproduction” or a politically “productive” work (Pêcheux 155): they may reinscribe the same and support the reigning discourse or work for change and displacement, redistributions in the discursive field, depending on whether the subject is positioned by the interdiscourse in identification or counter-identification with a discursive formation (158). Significantly, Pêcheux also theorizes a third position not caught up in binary relations of identity/negation. Displacement produces the “disidentification effect” (162) articulated in counter-discourses.

This formulation of a concept of counter-discourse or counter-hegemonic discourse is important in conceptualizing a vari-directional system. But other theorists have more specifically analyzed literary discourse as a field of centrifugal forces. Most significant among these is Bakhtin, whose conceptualization of the discursive field as one of competing languages of different social groups or “heteroglossia” (“polyglossia” being a competing field of foreign languages within a single national language) is developed through an analysis of fictional forms. Ideology, as Bakhtin/Medvedev outline the grounds for a Marxist study of discourse, would study both the “forms of organized ideological material as meaningful material” and the “forms of the social intercourse by which this meaning is realized.” It is Bakhtin's initiative towards the classification of these forms of exchange among discourses which develops in greater detail the complexities of “interdiscourse,” the characteristics and forms of imbrication, important for the theorization of counter-discourses. Bakhtin's work on the interface of signification and communication helps elaborate theoretical models of textual exchanges wherein discourses are displaced and destabilized. Interdiscursive (or intertextual) relations are played out in relations within and between texts, genres and practices. These are contradictory movements of and between discursive sites within what is a “structural model of uneven development.” Bakhtin asserts an open and future-oriented poetics, one that would
rethink claims to the mastery of knowledge, and consequently “formulates the conflictual dimension, as the realm of the social determination of the weight and value of discursive elements.” In this, he sets out a materialist theory of discourse in which ideological creation, the production of meanings and values, is realized in historically specific things and actions. “Every ideological product (ideologeme) is a part of the material social reality surrounding man [sic], an aspect of the materialized ideological horizon” (Bakhtin/Medvedev, Formal 8).

This is central to Bakhtin’s elaboration of the dialogue, a double-voiced discourse which is oriented towards someone else’s discourse. Dialogic interrelationships among signifying discourses within a single context — “relationships of agreement/disagreement, affirmation/supplementation, question/answer, etc. — are purely dialogic relationships, although not of course between words, sentences, or other elements of a single utterance, but between whole utterances.” Intersecting within the double-voicedness are two voices, two accents, two socially distinct practices. These voices may be subjected to re-evaluation when introduced into the first discourse, or even clash with hostility. Sometimes, the other’s word is not incorporated into the discourse, but remains outside though it is taken into account. This is a “hidden polemic” in which “a polemical blow is struck at the other’s discourse on the same theme, at the other’s statement about the same object.” “[T]he other’s words are treated antagonistically, and this antagonism, no less than the very topic being discussed, is what determines the author’s discourse” (195). This is an especially significant element of literary discourse which, as Bakhtin says, not only anticipates in advance the objections of its readers and critics, but reacts to a preceding literary style as an “anti-stylization” of it (196).

As well, there is “internally polemical discourse — the word with a sideward glance at someone else’s hostile word” (196). The dialogic or double-voiced discourse — whether parody, irony, parallax, imitation (with a difference), stylization — re-marks convention by incorporating the word of another within it. The characteristic stance of the dialogic text is the one-within-the-other. Points of antagonism overlap, collide and explode. They interrogate boundaries, challenge the hierarchy of sites of discourse, force the threshold and move into the liminal, working the in-between, site of movement and change. In response to the desire for purity of the dominant discourse with its mechanisms of exclusion, they offer textual contamination, ambiguity. For the complexity of their double articulation arises from the fact that the discursive practices are both connected and disassociated: the logic of subject-identity that posits one subject for one discourse for one site or practice is confounded in this concept of discourse as a network of intersecting discourses or intertextuality wherein inside and outside are relational positions with respect to specific discourses not in subjection to a singular power. What such heterogeneity and hybridization effect through permutations and instabilities is the possibility of “shifting the very terms of the [semiotic] system itself” (White 58) by dispersing...
and displacing the very possibility of hierarchization. Here the importance of the
dialogic for discourses of resistance becomes clear. It establishes a theory of a trans-
formative practice grounded in critique and resistance. For the focus of the dialogic
is on change, on bodies and social formulations as s(c)ites of instability and dis-
placement. In these terms, the project of Native writers is not merely inscribed
within the dominant discourse as opposition, but is a destabilizing movement in the
field of power relationships.

Heterogeneity,” fractured genres, “polymorphous” sub-
jects, “borderland” sites — these are the marks of “resistance writing” especially as
practised by Native North Americans under “métissage” in their within/without
relation to the dominant social formations. Indeed, embedded within the historical
and material conditions of their production as a politicized challenge to conven-
tional literary standards, resistance narratives are examples of “‘heteroglossia,’ in
their composite forms as historical document, ideological analysis and visions of
future possibilities” (Harlow 75, 99). This is indeed a “Manichean Aesthetics,”
as Abdul JanMohamed has termed it:

Even though an African may adopt the formal characteristics of English fiction,
his rendition of colonial experience will vary drastically from that of a European,
not only because of the actual differences in experience, but also because of his
antagonistic attitude toward colonialist literature. (quoted in Harlow 106)

Like “minor literature,” resistance writing draws attention to itself and to litera-
ture in general as a political and politicized activity. Immediate and direct involve-
ment in a struggle against ascendant or dominant forms of ideological and cultural
production is the task it stakes out for itself (Harlow 28). But, as JanMohamed’s
observation makes clear, this political engagement is co-terminous with “formal experimentation” (96). This is not, however, a formalist project. Rather, experi-
mentation or the exploration of the formal limitations of the literary codes “imposes
historical demands and responsibilities on a reader” (Harlow 95; my emphasis).
Narrative is a way of exploring history and questioning the historical narratives of
the colonizer which have violently interposed themselves in place of the history of
the colonized. Experimentation, especially with structures of chronology, is part
of this challenge, a radical questioning of historiographical versions of the past as
developed in the “master narratives,” in order to rewrite the historical ending
(Harlow 85-86). Archaeology is undertaken for Utopian aims. This results in
a-grammatical texts whose palimpsestic mode produces mediations and/or contra-
dictions. Given the ideological function of forms, when they are reappropriated and
refashioned in different social and cultural contexts, the generic message of earlier
social formations persists, thus producing sedimented structures, complicating the
pressure on the genre for ideological change (Jameson 141). Exhibiting the dis-
identification of counter-discourse in their hybridity, these forms constitute “new 
objects of knowledge” (Said, in Harlow 116) that require new discursive practices 
in order to analyze them.

A third characteristic of resistance literature is that it be produced within a strug-
gle for decolonization. Contemporary history, Jacques Berque has suggested, is the 
history of decolonization, the struggle to rewrite history by those without a history 
(Harlow 4). History as it has unfolded has been the story of what the white man 
did, histories of colonialism written by imperialists. The struggle over the historical 
record is seen by all parties as no less crucial than armed struggle. As Frantz Fanon 
has described this struggle:

Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its chains and empty-
ning the native’s head of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to 
the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. This work of 
devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today.41 
This awareness of the dialectical relations of the role of culture and cultural resis-
tance as part of a larger struggle for liberation has involved theorizing differential 
subject positions for the author. S/he may write from opposing discursive forma-
tions and aesthetics: an “aesthetic of oppression and exploitation and of acquies-
cence with imperialism; and that of human struggle for total liberation.”42 This 
struggle for liberation may itself be conducted from different sites with respect to 
power, each with its own strategies and techniques, from positions of “exile” or 
“under occupation.”43 This latter is the more complex, setting up a within/without 
posture for the writer in struggle under “cultural siege.” In this, as Fanon suggests, 
the writer must resist both the temptation to universalize and de-historicize the 
struggle, that is, adopting the perspective of the imperialist, which functions as a 
strategy of containment for the contestatory culture, and the inverse posture of a 
“return to the source,” a fetishizing of traditional Native culture as though the 
relation to the inherited past and cultural legacy had not been rendered problematic 
by the violent interruption of colonial and imperial history. In this inversion, culture 
is transformed into artifacts, museum pieces.

Resistance literature, in contradistinction, takes up a position of dis-identification 
which explores the interference of a struggle for power on the transmission of a 
cultural tradition. It takes as its starting point the radical fact of its present situation 
as the culture of a colony. This insistence on the “‘here-and-now’ of historical reality 
and its conditions of possibility,” is the sine qua non of resistance literature (Harlow 
16). Indeed, distance, “scientific dispassion,” “academic objectivity,” are rejected 
by such writers and critics as Kanafani, as postures of isolation and universalization 
(Harlow 3-4). Central to the struggle is not just an attempt to reconstruct the 
history of the relations of power between those groups in struggle, by giving access 
to “history” for those who have been denied an active role in history and its making,
but to transform historiography itself on the contested terrain of (re)writing "history" from the grounds of a "genealogy of 'filiation' based on ties of kinship, ethnicity, race or religion, to those of an 'affiliative' secular order" (Harlow 22). In the process, however, the objectivity and distance of imperial "affiliative" historiography is "contaminated" by "filiative" genealogies. What is foregrounded is history as narrative, history as telling, history as a process of unfolding of local stories, or provisional truths — narratives that make no claims to universal Truth.

Such an emphasis on the discursive constitution of truth effects a change in value that results from a critical parallax or shift in perspective, one which introduces into a singular discourse a rhetorical plurality or heteroglossia, the introduction of protocols of critique. Change in perspective inflects a disjunction in the relations of perception between the seer and the seen, the subjective "eye"/I and the represented world, as they are related to each other, but also as they relate to the source of perceiving consciousness "outside." This shift in frames of perception and reference keys different discursive conventions and produces an instability, a confounding of several representations, in what the theory of perspective had taught us to be a hierarchical and fixed mode of relation. Such a functional change in a sign system is, as Gayatri Spivak writes, "a violent event" (In other, 197), a riposte to the "rhetorical violence" (de Lauretis 10) of the dominant sign systems with their positioning of the Native as Other, as token of exchange.

In turn, the disjunction in perception destabilizes the fixity of one's place in the structure, and consequently opens up "the entire problematic of representing the other" (Terdiman 28), the ideological inflection of all representation. Representations are practices, signifying systems, Griselda Pollock reminds us. Representation in its most common sense stresses that images and texts (of trees or persons, for instance) are ordered according to pictorial and/or literary conventions. But representation in a second sense signifies the articulation of the political processes, practices and effects both determining and affected by representational practices. Understood here is Marx's distinction between "vertreten" where the Subject of Power "speaks for" in the political arena, through a proxy, an orator, the law, and representation or "darstellen," representation as re-presentation, as in art or philosophy where in writing or on the stage, by portraits or actors, the subjects of the oppressed speak for themselves. This third inflection of representation signifies something represented to, addressed to a reader/viewer/consumer and foregrounds the relations of seer and seen to the economic and political networks which constitute the "outside." Here the rhetoric-as-persuasion of "vertreten" is displaced by the rhetoric-as-trope of "darstellen": representation, it is made clear, is always re-presentation, something staged for a specific audience. Although the two modes of representation are unstable and constantly colliding — "the relationship between the imperialist subject and the subject of imperialism is at least ambiguous" (297) — it is important, Spivak contends, to pay attention to "the double session" (279),
to the enunciative instance with its power valences inflecting all presentations of the
other. When history presents itself as narrative, as telling, it foregrounds this act of
enunciation and thematizes those important questions: who is speaking, to whom,
under what conditions. Representation as re-presentation, as narrative staging.

This interruption in the power of representation to
dissimulate itself is analyzed in slightly different terms by Bakhtin in the contrast
he develops between “monologic” speech, totalizing and authoritative which “can-
not be represented — it is only transmitted” and dialogism, characteristic of the
novel as genre, which is represented speech. The words of others are put into quo-
tation marks, “qualified” and “externalized,” both represented and representing.
In this clash of many speech genres, the word is shown as “incomplete” and “con-
ditional.” Such hybridization “appropriates” and “reworks” the other’s discourse
redistributively in a mode of “symbolic dissidence” (White 25) or resistance, a
mode of “disidentification” (Pécheux). In this double articulation, discursive prac-
tices are both connected and disassociated: the logic of subject-identity that posits
one subject for one discourse for one site or practice is confounded in this hetero-
genrety and hybridization.

In different ways, Slash and I Am Woman thematize this representation as re-
presentation or “re-accentuation,” in Bakhtin’s term, by re-writing the conventions
of representing the Native. Through her autobiographical “I,” Lee Maracle nar-
rates herself as a political representative for women and for Métis. But this is a com-
plex intertextual game, for interpellated in her title is I Am an Indian, an anthology
of some of the first Native writing to emerge from the Indian Movement in the
sixties. Indirectly, then, she also represents Indianness. Métissage is both theme
and narrative mode in Maracle’s text. The hybridization of Armstrong’s text de-
velops through the strategies of fiction writing where, deploying the techniques of
the genre for represented speech, Armstrong re-presents the autobiographical nar-
rative of a Native man in quotation marks, interrogated and provisional, staged
within an ironic frame produced by the silences and repetitions of this represented
speaker.

But the force of their political dis/place-ment of conventional representational
practices is most immediately evident in the contestatory politics thematized in their
texts. Indeed the specific frame of their discursive intervention, their critical paral-
allax, is the elaboration of Native Canadian rights within the context of anti-
capitalist, anti-imperialist politics, both at the local micro-political level, in the
discussion of aboriginal land claims as it had become a matter for occupations of
cabinet ministers’ offices by participants in a “Youth Conference” (Armstrong
125-28), and as it had become the subject of debate over the extent of these claims
among the Okanagans whose reserves, not covered by the Proclamation of 1763,
are not legal (Armstrong 134), but also on a continent-wide level in the emergent political force of AIM (American Indian Movement) whose history and activities during the 1960s and 1970s are outlined through the eyes of Tommy Kelasket in Slash and in “The Rebel,” a chapter in I Am Woman. Both, indirectly in the first, explicitly in the second, record important events, whether these be the Okanagan tribe’s hard-won moratorium on uranium mining (Maracle 120, Armstrong 235) or the confrontation at Wounded Knee (Armstrong 111-18, Maracle 126).

Both, moreover, explicitly ground this re-visionary historiography in a struggle for decolonialization. One of Tommy’s key insights which he offers to his childhood friend Jimmy, a business administration graduate who can’t find a job, regards the subtle effects of colonization: “Everything that the colonizers do, tells the Indians they are inferior, that their lifestyle, their language, their religion, their values and even what food they eat, is somehow not as good” (221). To avoid “feel[ing] so shitty inside” (222), they admire and imitate the colonizer. What Tommy doesn’t state, though the novel reveals ironically through his silence and his gestures, is that the colonized also lashes out in inexplicable violence which is self-violence. In one of his many outbursts of rage, Tommy earns his nickname “Slash.” Both his violence and his constant movement are the effects of self-hatred. His agitation to “DO SOMETHING” (120) leads him to chafe at directives to do things the “Indian Way”: instead of “peaceful occupation[s], . . . I wanted violence” (126).

The framework of decolonization theory allows Tommy (and Armstrong) to view the Native’s situation of powerlessness within a systemic analysis of power relations. Understanding that his problems are not just “personal,” or rather that the “personal is political,” is the political education Tommy painfully and slowly undergoes.

Maracle makes these points about the politics of personal and communal self-destruction more directly:

The busting up of communities, families, and the loss of the sense of nationhood and the spirit of cooperation among the colonized, are the aims of the colonizer. A sense of powerlessness is the legacy handed down to the colonized people for achievement of the aim of the colonizer. LOSS OF POWER — the negation of choice, legal and cultural victimization, is the hoped for result. (120)

It is this powerlessness which produces violence, she argues. That she belongs to a conquered people who are “spiritually dead” is both the effect and the determinant of sexual violence. That an entire culture has been “raped,” has made it impossible for them to love themselves, for Native men to cherish Native women. Admiring the dominant white culture, they adopt its values, seeing only “dark-skinned sensuality” in Native women as Other — the Squaw, not the Princess — raping them and beating them up (52-73, especially 71). Rage against the colonizer is deflected and turned inward on the colonized’s own culture in a process of self-destruction.

Despite the extent of this oppression, this self-division from identifying against the self as Other, Natives have resisted and continue to resist. Indeed, as Maracle
points out, there is a history of resistance parallel to the history of colonization. It is a history which inspires the struggle against destruction of homelands as on Meares Island in the Queen Charlotte Islands (Maracle 120) or in AIM’s retraction of the “Trail of Tears” of 1838 when Tribes in the southeastern United States were forced to move to Oklahoma and leave their land for white settlers (Armstrong 96). But resistance comes also through the knowledge of resistance. As Maracle writes: “There is power in knowing” (123). Against the “destruction and expropriation of knowledge,” that is, against the practice of colonialism (Maracle 120), Maracle proposes the strategies of de-colonization: “re-writing of history,” which is not “betrayal” as it seems to the “elite,” but is the rebel altering her conditions, “re-writing her life onto the pages of a new history” (Maracle 121; emphasis added).

This is the “re-accentuation” of the dominant discourse in the “hidden polemic,” as Bakhtin characterizes the agonistic (dialogic) positioning of utterances and speaking subjects within the discursive system. In Armstrong’s novel, the focus of Slash’s travels across the continent with the Indian Movement is to reclaim this expropriated knowledge of his history: “I hadn’t even heard of it,” he says of the “Trail of Tears,” “but then I guess that was the point of this whole trip: to educate” (Armstrong 95). His narration is re-presented as an alternate history, a history of struggle, the story of the “many things” that he has seen which, even though he is young, make him feel old in experience. “Few [of his people] have accepted this teacher and taken her gifts.” Consequently, he feels compelled to offer his particular view, his “story” for his son “and those like him” (Armstrong 253). Slash justifies his narrative in the framing “Epilogue,” which thematizes the instance of enunciation of his personal (hi)story that is representative of his tribal history.

The importance of these two books to re-visionary historiography is that they document the struggle of Natives today within a history of resistance. Writing from a position of “cultural siege,” “under occupation,” Armstrong and Maracle analyze their position within an active struggle of decolonization. This is an epistemic break, as we shall see, both with respect to the semiotic field engendering the “imaginary Indian” in white writing on the Native — s/he is historicized not mythologized — nor is it history as timeless myth as in traditional Native “historical” narratives of mystical orality which reify an “original source.” Rather it is a new history and historiography different from both, the history of struggle in the 1960s and 1970s in a hybrid narrative mode. This is history as narrating, as telling, in traditional native fashion, but within recognizable dates and events and the conventions of “colonial” history. The narrative conventions of genealogical and affiliative orders of historiography are both operative. Nonetheless, these historical narratives make great demands on the reader for different historical knowledge, one not taught in schools. In this, they foreground their partial — fragmented and interested — knowledges. Examining their challenge to Knowledge and necessarily,
as they forcefully claim, to power, I shall try to identify crucial locations in the texts where they stutter in the articulation of conventions, using these as levers to open out the ideology of colonialist and racist discourse in an act of explication. This will emerge as several fragments that will be read speculatively.

To read the spine of the cover of Slash and I Am Woman is to locate one such disruption of convention, one within the literary institution which mediates the meaning produced by these texts in the field of “Canadian” literature. Generally, along with the writer’s signature and title of the book is labelled the publishing house which has produced the text. On Maracle’s book there is a blank space. While the other textual apparatus of ISBN (International Standard Book Number) is to be found inside on the back of the title page, we are directed there only to “Write-on Press Publishers 1988,” which further investigation reveals to be a publisher set up for the occasion. I Am Woman is a self-published book. In this gesture, Maracle takes charge of the mediation of her text so as to overcome the coercive powers of the dominant literary institution which would make her “speak it right,” “speak white” either by refusing to publish her text or by shaping it through the editorial process to fit the conventions of Native life-writing, as happened to Maria Campbell’s Halfbreed.49 In this gap, and in the acknowledgments where she expresses her debt to “Native people, Palestinians, Chileans, Filipinos [sic], Eritreans, Ethiopians, El Salvadorans, Anti-apartheid activists and Black Canadian and American people” (Maracle iv) and dedicates her text “To my children,” Maracle foregrounds the discursive formation in which her text is positioned as one of anti-imperialist resistance to the dominant white, Westernized literary institutions.

Armstrong’s text is also positioned on the margins of the Canadian publishing institution, though its interlocutors are not those engaged in international decolonization movements, but her tribe, the Okanagans, engaged in struggle over land claims, a fight against “internal colonialism.”50 On the spine of Slash, alongside the author’s signature, is printed “Theytus Books.” This, we learn from the publisher’s catalogue is “Canada’s First Native Indian Owned and Operated Publishing House,” a publishing project with which Armstrong has been closely associated as writer of books for children, Enwhisteetka and Neekna and Chemai. “Theytus,” so the catalogue informs us, is a Coast Salish word that “translates as ‘preserving for the purpose of handing down.’” With a variety of texts ranging from trivia games on Native lore, to videos, archeological treatises, plays, traditional stories and fiction, Theytus seeks to enlarge the concept of “education” and to produce new knowledge for/by Natives. This too is self-publishing, circumventing the domi-
narrative literary institution, in a way, however, with well-produced texts and catalogues, that mimics the dominant institutions. Armstrong’s self-description is, in this sense, revealing:

I’ve never really thought about being a Canadian writer; I’ve always thought of myself as a Native writer... In terms of Native writers, Leslie Silko and N. Scott Momaday, both Americans, have influenced me. Maria Campbell, who has shown so much endurance, has given me the courage to write. I recently was fortunate to meet Beatrice Culleton who wrote *In Search of April Raintree*. I really have a lot of respect for those two women, who have produced novels of real significance in terms of Native literature in Canada.51

Like Maracle, Armstrong is less concerned with writing “authentically,” “like a Native,” within the semiotic field of the indigene or even within its negation, but in taking up a third position both within and without to create a new cultural community. She is not preoccupied with “Truth,” but with good storytelling, with producing the tale to be told over and over.

The emergence of such Native publishing ventures in the 1980s, which has produced the category of “Native Literature in Canada,” is the result of the political activism of Native peoples in the 1960s with the founding of such organizations as the National Indian Brotherhood (1968) and the subsequent advocacy of a policy of “Indian Control of Indian Education,” as enunciated in a position paper of 1972. The need to establish course materials for such initiatives has resulted in a proliferation of curriculum-related materials, books and tapes. Most of these cultural productions are specific to a Native language group, locality, or Indian Band, and do not trespass on the terrain of the dominant publishing industry. In this way, they figure as negation of the dominant paradigm. Theytus Books and Pemmican Press (in Winnipeg) have adopted a more ambiguous and contestatory position, however, aiming to produce books for the larger Canadian market. Like other publishers operating on this scale, they receive block grants from the Canada Council. Unlike them, however, Theytus is not a capitalist enterprise operated for profit, but is run by the Nicola Valley Indian Administration and the Okanagan Tribal Council under the Okanagan Indian Educational Resources Society.52 It is primarily, but not exclusively, interested in publishing the works of Native authors and has plans to help such writers through their apprenticeship at the newly established “En’owkin International School of Writing” run in conjunction with Okanagan College and the University of Victoria.53 In this attempt to open up a space for Native literature within the dominant literary institution, aiming for a general Canadian market, the press has been only partially successful: its audience has been primarily Native people. Moreover, the efforts to reach that audience through educational material for schools has suffered in competition with larger publishing houses such as UBC Press which publish materials with native content. In its
ambiguous material conditions both within and without the dominant economic institutions of publishing, Theytus enters into the hybridization produced also in its texts directed at a dual audience.

Such heterogeneity marks the texts with respect to gender politics as well. It is here that Armstrong and Maracle have developed the most effective interruption into the semiotic field of the Native, have most forcefully resisted being the Other through whom the anglophone Canadian can “go native,” and find her cultural identity. Armstrong especially refuses the binary positions of Princess and Squaw available to her as a woman. Both reject the representation of Native women offered them in the dominant institution as women writers in that they refuse to develop portraits of the powerful Mother-Goddess, source of all wisdom, accessible through Shamanic initiation. Indeed, Armstrong centres her narrative on the retrospective vision of a young man. That this constitutes an open challenge to the Canadian feminist movement which has invested so heavily in representations of Native women as it develops a “radical” feminism, is made clear in the reviews of Slash in the feminist press. Typical is the one which, favourable in its recommendation of the book as both “powerful and easy,” a book which offers a “glimpse” at the differing political perspectives of Indian and white politicians, concludes:

One of the puzzling things about Slash is why Armstrong, a strong Indian woman, chose to write the story entirely from the viewpoint of a man. We don’t get to know any of the women in the novel and the interesting things they are doing politically are glimpsed only through Tom’s eyes. I found this somewhat frustrating, but not enough to distract me from the story.54

Armstrong has engaged in a hidden polemic with the discourse of white feminists. To the demand of the women’s movement in the white community for representations of strong women as the primordial focus of “good” women’s writing, Armstrong has replied in a way that foregrounds the complexity of the Native women’s political engagement on several fronts, where the struggle against racism is as important as that against gender oppression. That writing is a powerful tool for her as a woman, she is quick to admit:

Men have easier access to other avenues for getting some of their understanding across — politics is one way that they express their resistance and are trying to make change. For Native women that hasn’t been available, because of sexism; writing has been one of the only tools available to them. (Freeman 38)

As she points out, to adopt this masculine perspective was a hard choice, but was dictated by the fact that she was writing a historical novel. She is not writing the dominant “romance quest,” though the confessional form fissures the generic purity of the historical novel, dis/placing it toward the mode of self-realization central to the quest genre. This is a quest not for a mythic Origin, but for historical
Though there were some women, like Nova Scotia Micmac Anna Mae Aquash, who played leadership roles in the American Indian Movement, “it was the young Native male who was at the forefront of that movement” (Freeman 36). This is a text which took Armstrong more than a year to research, a chronicle designed to show the change over the past twenty years in Native politics from the strong militancy of the early Seventies to the “more positive approach” today (Freeman 36).

Nonetheless, though no longer the mystical, oracular wise woman, the Native woman remains a strong presence in Armstrong’s fiction. Indeed, the constant quest of Tommy which seems directionless, without dénouement in its repetition and perpetual loss, is punctuated by his encounters with strong women who, for a time, give him an education in politics which reorients and centres his life. Crucial here is his meeting with Mardi when he comes out of prison following the fight in which he earned both his symbolic scars and his nickname. Like a will-o’-the-wisp, always somewhere ahead of him in the thick of conflict, her actions reported to him in the rumours and stories of other activists, Mardi introduces him to the Indian Movement and acts as a model of political activity. Later, Maeg, the mother of his son, fulfils the same role as teacher and source of inspiration within the Oka-nagan community. “A soft intensity” in her presence is what first attracts him to her (Armstrong 225), that and the power in her mother’s words which she speaks to the meeting, words encouraging the group to a position of resistance in continuation of the ways of their forefathers on this question of land rights which they have continuously refused to abrogate in a treaty. Like Mardi, Maeg dies violently in an accident through her engagement in political activity. One way of reading Tommy’s story would be as the narrative of his aimless wandering in the absence of a strong feminine presence: violence rules his life without the power of the grandmothers. This would be to read Armstrong’s fiction as an idealization of the feminine as inspiration and muse. Though there are traces of this narrative, it has been dis/placed, de-mythologized. These are not goddesses, nor medicine women with oracular powers. Indeed, Armstrong forcefully counters such representations of the Native woman as Shaman in her description of Maeg through Tommy’s eyes:

Her hair was thick, brown and wavy. It hung past her shoulder and her skin was smooth and light brown. She hadn’t worn any choker of beads or braids. In fact her clothes were just plain, not the usual ‘radical Indian’ or ‘office Indian’ garb. I hadn’t been able to tell where she stood from her clothes. She was dressed too plain to have been one of those people who were ‘into’ Indian medicine ways, in a cult kind of attitude. (Armstrong 225)

Armstrong here is re/writing the sign of the “imaginary Indian,” in a process of “making history” (Maracle 120).
Maracle’s major interlocutor is the mainstream women’s movement which she hails in her title by foregrounding the question of gender in her political analysis. In this, the intersection of struggles over race and gender power alignments appears to be different in her work than in Armstrong’s. Nevertheless, Maracle explicitly thanks Jeannette Armstrong and her family for introducing her to the “teachings of our ancient ones, . . . of my grandmothers” (Maracle 43), and to an understanding of spirituality and traditional Native ways. These are located not on an a-temporal, mythological plane, in some pure moment of Origin, but in specific historical and material practices. What is “sacred” is the will of the people, democracy. It is important not only for the Native to practise democracy (Maracle 49) but also to share it with the rest of Canadian society. This European “settler society” has laws which legalize the oppression of the Native, whereas the laws of the Native forbid oppression (Maracle 47). Like Armstrong, who also argues for the importance of Native theories of democracy (Freeman 38), Maracle proclaims the importance of the political in Native spirituality against the “Traditionalism” which has “become the newest coat to cloak their hidden agenda” (Maracle 47). She explicitly rejects an inversion of the semiotic values of the indigene and a fetishizing of tradition that fails to take into account the interruption of imperialist history and the resulting conflict. Here, too, the inexplicable violence of the Native within this semiotic field is shown to be the effect of imperial desire, not something “natural” in the indigene. The importance of the grandmothers in giving love and discipline to help develop self-respect in Native children and interrupt the cycle of self-hatred and self-destruction that is the legacy of colonialism for the Natives, is both human and political, devoid of the transcendentalism and magic of the Grandmother in the semiotic field of the indigene. There are none of the metamorphoses of Copper Woman and her daughters in the activities of Maracle’s grandmothers!

Indeed, Maracle attacks head-on the values of mysticism, attributing them to the dominant culture rather than to the Native.

I think that white people who indulgently refer to us as a spiritual people are unable to escape the chains of a parasitic culture. Parasites need a host to sustain them. They cannot sustain themselves. White people produce the stuff of life for white folks. Even in their own land, the majority of farm labor is non-whites or children. Since they rarely work at productive labor that is physical, they cannot conceive of laboriously unravelling their bodily person and discovering their spirit within. (Maracle 149)

As she points out, the way to discover a “spiritual being” is through hard physical exercise: “There is no easy route to spiritual re-birth” (Maracle 150).

Maracle interrupts the semiotic field by exposing the production of its values within specific social practices of exploitation. In this, she analyzes the operations
of symmetrization and inversion operative in the Imaginary relations of White and Native, wherein the former, operating from lack and desire, mis-recognizes itself in an other, which becomes the Other, the absent full presence or plenitude of identity. In the Imaginary, this is represented as a relationship of I/you, of subject/object, which excludes the important social relationships. The contexts of relations of power are objectified and obscured, so that exploitation and oppression are masked when subjects are treated as floating atoms, as objects. These strategies of scapegoating through which a single discourse becomes the dominant discourse are exposed in Maracle’s narrative through analysis of their processes. She also disrupts the dominant codes by hybridizing them.

This is especially evident in the case of spirituality which she frames within the transformative process of translation. Discussing the practices of native spirituality, of healing through purification, she interrupts to define the word “Prayer,” as begging, pleading. Contrasting Native practices in this regard as being closer to “putting our minds together to heal” (Maracle 148), she outlines the slippage in meaning between Native languages and English. “That is not the equivalent of prayer. However, there is no word for this process in the English language” (Maracle 148). Rather than advocating a return to source and to the “purity” of these languages, she argues for the invention of a hybrid spirituality.

We then must make one up or integrate our own word into the language. English does not express the process of ceremony. Yet, we are forced to communicate within its limits. We must differentiate and define our sense of spirituality in English. (Maracle 148)

The result, however, will be to dis/place the concept of spirituality and prayer in English where instead of a unitary definition it will be polysemic. The translation effect is a “dis-identification effect,” the politically productive work of polyglossia functioning here as heteroglossia which disrupts the hierarchization of discourses, English over Native.

While Maracle’s text could be said to present the analytical framework for concepts that Slash re-presents, it adds an extra dimension, however, in its explicit analysis of the interlocking oppressions of sex and gender. Foregrounding the question of gender in the second chapter, “I Am Woman,” Maracle charts the evolution in her thinking on this question as she moves from a belief that “it was irrelevant that I was a woman” (Maracle 16) to her present understanding of the centrality of this denial of womanhood to the imperialist project. Here Maracle also engages in a hidden polemic with Native politics and its effacement of gender. A feminist analysis is central to her theorizing of racial oppression. In refusing a place for women and for love, the Native has played out the colonialist reduction of a people to “a sub-human level” (Maracle 20). Through her analysis she hopes to infuse love into Native communities again and so increase self-respect. This is one of several strategies of “empowerment” (Maracle 113) she advocates which would
re-align the binary axes of this semiotic field so that the Native no longer functions as negative, as Other, for White identity politics.

"Racism is recent, patriarchy is old" (Maracle 23). This is the position from which Maracle now views these as interlocking oppressions. She attacks Native men for standing up to recognize white women when they come into the room and accepting their word as final arbiter while they demand that Native women make written submissions to meetings. Native women are denied the opportunity granted men of defending their opinions in public debate and honing their reasoning skills (Maracle 25). To both white and Native men, women are considered mere "vessels of biological release for men" (Maracle 27). Interrupting the semiotic values of sexuality ascribed to the indigene as "Squaw," Maracle discusses the strategic importance of interrogating men in public meetings on their sexual activities (Maracle 29). Important in her feminist analysis here is making a distinction between sex and love.

But in raising this issue, Maracle contests the feminist movement too which, she says, has been embarrassed by the word "love" (Maracle 31). While Maracle's discussion of Native spirituality and her insistence on the primacy of patriarchy as oppression, would seem to make her arguments appealing to North American feminists, as, indeed, its future publication by Women's Press implies, I Am Woman is no text for easy consumption. Maracle challenges the assumptions of dominant feminism, as of left-wing and Native movements, with regards to their attempts to limit and contain the truth claims of Native women. In this frame, the title of Maracle's book is an ironic staking out of claims to generalize about the oppression of women in face of the women's movement's refusal to recognize these truth claims:

No one makes the mistake of referring to us as women either. White women invite us to speak if the issue is racism or Native people in general. We are there to 'teach', to 'sensitize them', or to serve them in some other way. We are expected to retain our position well below them as their servants. We are not, as a matter of course, invited as an integral part of 'their movement' — the women's movement. (Maracle 20-21)

In this regard, Maracle's self-presentation also functions as a critical intervention into the discursive formation: she positions herself as the unspeakable, as paradox confounding discursive norms, as Native woman intellectual, one, moreover, who is a school drop-out, but who quotes T. S. Eliot (Maracle 88) and writes her text in poetry. "I here, now confess, I am an intellectual... I am lonely" (Maracle 130). The second statement is a direct consequence of the first, since Maracle's position violates all the discursive norms for the category "intellectual." She has none of the semiotic values that would grant her word claims to Truth. As she writes:

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There is nothing worse than being a woman who is dark, brilliant and declasse. Darkness is the absence of natural (normal?) class polish. Admit this, all of you. I laugh too loud, can’t hold my brownie properly in polite company and am apt to call shit, ‘shit’. I can’t be trusted to be loyal to my class. In fact, the very clever among the elite know that I am opposed to the very existence of an elite among us. (Maracle 131)

It is this heterogeneity of Maracle’s discourse which disrupts decorum. While her analysis of politics is conducted at times in lucid logic and eloquent, balanced statements, at others it is conveyed in the vulgarity of slang, when she addresses men about “getting your rocks off” (Maracle 29). Analysis alternates with anecdote in embedded stories of many troubled Natives. These in turn are continually broken up by poems which in condensed form probe the contradictory emotions, varying from rage to love, which are expressed in this text.

These violations of decorum are more striking in that they disrupt the unity of tone characteristic of written genres. That Maracle presents her insights and theories in writing is in itself a major intervention in the discursive norm of orality within which are positioned the utterances of the Native. Introducing her text, Maracle self-reflexively focuses on the hybridity of her text as “scraps,” “scribbling” on what most people would consider “garbage” — “paper napkins, brown bags and other deadwood paraphernalia” (Maracle 1). Central though is the opposition between orality and writing, developed here not as the privileging of the former, as in the dominant discourse on Native cultural forms, but as a compulsion toward the latter: “writing when I should have been mothering,” as she pointedly contrasts (Maracle 9). Although the text is presented as first-person narration, the textual marker of oral narration, this is not presentation, but representation. For the text is a compilation of stories, a miscellany: although they give the illusion of truth, the anecdotes are fictional.

It is the practice of writers to fictionalize reality and prostitute the product of their licentious fantasies. “Artistic license,” they call it. (Whoever ‘they’ are.) Being not different, I have taken both the stories of my life, the stories of other’s lives and some pure fabrications of my imagination and re-written them as my own.... Usually, when one writes of oneself it is called non-fiction — I dis-believe that. Hindsight is always slightly fictitious. (Maracle 3-4)

Self-reflexively framing her exposition and narrative in this reflection on the displacement of writing, on writing as trace and différence, on writing as the construction of fictions of identity, Maracle foregrounds these representations of the Native as re-presentations where rhetoric is trope — the staging of Natives speaking for themselves.

This thematization of the instance of enunciation is central to Maracle’s quarrel with the institutions of knowledge which she contests from her position as “intellectual.” Writing, especially the writing of history, is a terrain which for her is mined
with the racist texts of the settler society. It is the educational system which valorizes and propagates writing. But it is the educational system where the dehumanizing gaze of the colonizer is most present, teaching the Native child that s/he is a “cannibal” (Maracle 103), effacing her history and replacing it with a mimicry of the colonizer’s narrative. The educational scene as staged by Maracle is a scene of mindless repetition, the Native parroting the anthropologist’s discourse without understanding the language (Maracle 47-48). Here is the “translation effect” of heteroglossia engaged in its most productive work of dis-identification when translation is staged, is re-presented, as a crucial strategy in the colonialist struggle over discursive authority. This scene is also the child reading out of the history book, an “asinine practice” designed to “integrate” the child into European society.

The teacher called my turn. I glanced at the clean white page with black characters all over it. ‘Louis Riel was a madman, that was hanged . . .’. I could not buy that anymore than I could the ‘cannibalism’ fairy tale of fifth grade. I could not forsake my ancestors for all your students to see. (Maracle 111)

Education is the primary thrust of racism, Maracle argues, “[s]chools have showed themselves to be ideological processing plants” (Maracle 113). Rather than abandoning the scene of writing to the settler education system, however, Maracle has taken up the pen to disrupt those representations of the Native as cannibal, as madman, to expose the ideological foundations that are re-produced through such representations. In this, she stakes out a claim for alternate forms of truth: “your knowledge is not the only knowledge we seek” (Maracle 112). These are knowledges that make no claims to the universal since they are elaborated in polemical relation to the settler knowledge which does make claims to be singular Truth. Consequently, they acknowledge their provisionality and partiality.

Maracle’s intervention in the disciplinary norms of historiography effects the dis/placement of bilingualism, the heteroglossia of the translation effect. Running the danger of becoming a “crippled two-tongued slave” as her grandmother warned her (Maracle 85, 109), Maracle is still engaged in addressing the colonizer, trying to explain herself in his logic. But, as she makes clear, the implications of this will disrupt the fixed assumptions of this settler’s language. More than “prayer” will have shifted its meaning: “knowledge,” as we have seen, “intellect” are opening up their semantic fields to include desire, as both passion and engagement. Knowledge, Maracle contends, is always interested, always a site of struggle for contending views. As she comments in conclusion in “last word,” literature is such a field of contesting knowledges. Justifying the emotional range of her writing, Maracle takes issue with the common definitions of “anger” and “sadness” as used by a Native man to characterize Alice Walker’s The Color Purple. In doing so, he was making a case for not displaying such negative emotions since they sell well to “white folks” and perpetuate negative stereotypes of Natives.
To Maracle, Walker’s novel is not a “sad story full of hate” (Maracle 189): to hide the rage and madness created by the colonial process is to collaborate in maintaining an equally powerful mythology of the Native as untouched by imperialism whether in an “originary” tribal state or in peaceful assimilation to settler society. These are the “Truth” on the Native which Maracle seeks to disrupt by foregrounding the struggle for decolonization and the elaboration of a hybrid culture. Maracle will no longer collaborate in “whitewashing” history, in “writing r(w)ight.” She will not keep silent about the oppression she has suffered. Nor, however, will she collude in the norms of the dominant discourse which values struggle negatively and privileges narratives which work toward unity and harmony in (Romantic) resolution. She will write neither a “long sweet book,” nor a “short sad book.” Nostalgia has been dis/placed in struggle. Exclusion has not yielded to Utopia, but to the dialectics of history.

Armstrong, too, sets out to challenge disciplinary truths and to question the facts of history as they have been fixed in writing. Like Maracle, she refuses the binary opposition of a mystical orality as guarantor of Truth and stages her challenge to the dominant knowledge in the arenas of education and narrativity. The two are intertwined as they are in Maracle’s text, for Armstrong also troubles the easy oppositions of orality/writing even as she denounces the latter as an instrument of oppression when wielded by the dominant educational system.

Significantly, the first narrative scene in Slash is situated in a school where Tommy is fooling around in the line-up for vitamins with his fellow grade sixer, Jimmy. This is a one-room school that goes only to grade six. But it is different from the residential school which offers the higher grades in that, as his cousin Joe says, kids there were “beat up for talking Indian” (Armstrong 17). The following year, the Native children are sent to school in town: at once they confront racism. The principal separates the Native children from the whites to talk to them about the rules:

“You Indians are lucky to be here. We’ll get along just fine as long as you don’t steal from the other kids. I want you all to wait here while the nurse comes to check your heads and ask you some questions. Then I will assign you to classes.” (Armstrong 23-24)

Soon the white children in the school are calling them “frigging Injuns . . . nothing but thieves, full of lice” (Armstrong 24). Armstrong outlines the way in which this stereotypical representation of the dirty, thieving savage is produced through institutional practices. The practice of scapegoating, of constructing the Native as
imaginary Other, is analyzed step by step. She also exposes the destabilizing effects this has on the young people as perceived by Tommy's grandfather, Pra-cwa, who comments on the way they have become "ashamed of everything Indian" since they began going to school in town (Armstrong 25).

But the effects of this colonial alienation are extremely varied and complex. Armstrong deliberately eschews easy binary oppositions between the purity of traditional mores and the abasement of assimilation. Some of the Natives live in modern houses with TV's (Armstrong 25), others live more traditionally spending their evenings in storytelling, singing the Coyote Song or in the sweats (Armstrong 22, 37). Commodification and ritualization co-exist as social values. So, too, Natives both attend the Catholic church and are attentive to the teachings of the Creator of Indian spirituality (Armstrong 30).

This heterogeneity of response is especially true of the narrator, Tommy, who comes from a more traditional home where his family speak Okanagan — indeed his grandfather speaks no English — and spend their evenings telling oral tales to which Tommy enjoys listening. But Tommy is also an excellent student at school, learns English easily and is a good reader. The dichotomy between Okanagan/English, between oral/written modes of knowledge is dis/placed in Tommy's narrative as he moves easily back and forth between both modes of cultural production. He offers the dates, facts and analytical mode of imperial history as he recounts the events of the 1960s and 1970s, including the confrontation at Wounded Knee and the march on Ottawa. But these are presented in a disjointed manner with many repetitions, empty moments and embedded "oral anecdotes." Indeed, the circular form of the narrative with its opening and closing sections situated self-reflexively in the narrating instance, when Tommy explains his narrative goals and strategies, foregrounds this narrative as an oral performance that is paradoxically represented in writing. This framing device, however, introduces quotation marks to distance the reader from the tale unfolding in that its status as artifact is exposed. This is a staged representation, history as narrative, history as telling. Like Maracle's personal narrative, this too is a mixture of genres, not the ethnographical autobiography told to the white man, but the Native confessional mode developed in the Indian Movement crossed with the oral anecdote, and framed as self-reflexive written fiction foregrounding its narrative strategies. While on the one hand the text might be seen to develop generic links with postmodern historiographic metafiction, to adopt Linda Hutcheon's terminology, on the other, it shares generic features with a Native genre Armstrong much admires, "political oratory" (Freeman 37).

This hybridization is self-reflexively staged in the opening chapter in the oral tale (cautionary fable?) told by Tommy's cousin Joe, who is both a medicine man and a gifted tale-teller. The tale of "Hightuned Polly" and her dog that she "babied like some white woman do [sic]" (Armstrong 19) is a tragi-comic tale about the
perils of imitating the ways of the colonizer. At a stampede, Polly’s dog is in heat so that she is followed by a crowd of dogs wherever she walks carrying her dog. To stop this, Polly sews a buckskin pant for her dog. The following morning she finds her dog, a hole chewed in the pants, and a crowd of visitors surrounding her. But this narrative may also be read as a fable of the dis/placement produced by cultural heterogeneity, a *mise en abyme* of Armstrong’s own narrative. For the blending of cultural conventions here, the pampering of the dog but the failure to limit its fertility through neutering produces in/appropriate effects. These frustrate appropriation, however. The unbridled fertility of Polly’s dog, despite the attempts to limit and constrain sexuality, reinforces, even as it counters the stereotype of the promiscuous savage. For there is both nothing and everything “natural” about this promiscuity. This is a translation-effect of laughter-producing heteroglossia: repetition with a difference works here to dis/place the identity politics of verisimilitude and mimesis by emphasizing contradiction and paradox, the heterogeneous truths of *mimeis tekhné*, of mimicry. While this is presented as an oral tale, one of the “good stories [which] came out towards morning” (Armstrong 19), and as performance disrupts the economy of the trace, of writing, this is no “traditional” oral tale related to religious beliefs like the myths collected in so many anthologies of Native stories, but a contemporary carnivalesque anecdote which deals with the dilemmas of colonialism. Still, it invites allegorical reading and, in this, offers truth as interpretation, fiction as the way to (f)act.

While this anecdote, strategically placed in the first chapter, “The Awakening,” emphasizes the historical importance of narrative truth in Armstrong’s novel, the fiction/fact opposition is undercut along with the oral/written binary by the positioning of this story in the middle of an all-night conversation where the main issue is the problem of assimilation and the principal narrative strategy is dialogue and political debate. Tommy’s family is trying to decide what position to adopt at a meeting in Kamloops of all the Indian tribes in B.C. where a decision is to be taken on voting for “who was going to be the white man’s leader,” Diefenbaker, in this case. Tommy’s grandfather, Pra-cwa, a “headman,” argues against suffrage on the grounds that they wouldn’t want the white people voting for their Chief. “We live different than them and they live different than us.” On the contrary, as Tommy’s uncle reports, “some Indians think it’s okay. Some of them in the North American Indian Brotherhood want to vote. They say it’ll do some good. They say we would get a better deal on our lands.” However, Pra-cwa fears they “could be getting ready to sell us out of our reserves and make us like white people” (Armstrong 18). Against this cultural interpellation which comes through “paper laws” — all the apparati of the state and its educational institutions — the opening chapter sets a coded system of oppositional values from Native culture. But the narrative refuses to draw an imaginary boundary between the two antagonistic
cultural codes, deploying them instead in such political debates and carnivalesque parody which serve to collapse differences.

Though they are made to seem similar, these cultural codes produce different subject positions for the Native. Through policies such as enfranchisement (18), taxation (19), regulation of alcohol distribution (20) and the “white paper” (28), the state enforces Native assimilation through dependency. Cultural stereotypes are another source of infantilization and consequent racism, as in Hollywood representations which come through the television and educational systems: “Like one teacher, who explained what she wanted in slow Hollywood talk. She said, ‘You fix’um little story, Tommy, about how you live.’ To the other kids she had asked, ‘Please prepare a short biographical sketch of yourself’” (Armstrong 38-39). This rhetorical violence produces subjective violence for the Native interpellated into this discourse. But should he identify against himself with the white culture and opt for assimilation, he still faces alienation. Consequently, the narrative line of this apprenticeship story is feathered, divided. Tommy is offered a choice that is a non-choice as he advances in chapter 2 to “Trying It On.”

Whether “it” is embracing the materialism of white culture and becoming assimilated to its master narrative of development and progress or opting for the pastoral containment of the “old ways” of traditional Native culture is ambiguous. Instead, Tommy’s growth is measured by his increased skill in reading, in interpretation. When he was a child, he could decode the English words of the “white paper” to read to his father and grandfather (Armstrong 18). As he grows older, his hermeneutical skills develop through learning to read cultural codes for their ideology of racism. Increasingly, this places him in a difficult position with respect to his people, seeing more than many, unable to steer a clear course of action between two alternatives which seem more and more similar, equally dubious. In the final pages of the novel, this brings him into conflict even with his wife Maeg over the issue of Native rights in the Constitution. Maeg argues: “This is a people’s mission. We care for our rights and our land and we have a child. Maybe more than that, we have to clear the future for him. Nobody is looking out for our rights so we all have to do what we can. . . . That’s why I’ll go on that express and carry a sign that says, ‘CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR OUR CHILDREN’” (Armstrong 236). With its focus on the future, Maeg’s position entails a narrative of progress. While he acknowledges the importance of their rights to practise their ways and the need to alert public opinion to do something to protect them, Tommy is “uncomfortable about the whole thing” and reserves judgement till he can talk things over with the old people. By the time the trip is half over, he has managed to articulate his nagging doubt. He has perceived a split between the Indian politicians who are leading the caravan and the people who are singing to a different tune, one called the “Constitution Song”: “We don’t need your Constitution, B.C. is all Indian land. We don’t need your Constitution, hey yeah hey. . . . How much clearer
can it be?” he asks. “We don’t need anybody’s constitution, what we have is our own already. We hold rights to the land and to nationhood. We just need to have it recognized. We want to keep it” (Armstrong 241).

What he has recognized are the racist strategies of the state bullying the Natives into ceding all their land rights by threatening to leave them out of the constitution unless they “negotiate.” Power is in the Natives’ hands though, if they can just wait, for their bargaining power is ownership of the land. They are a sovereign people, not colonized Indians. But Slash’s attempt to convince the leaders of the strength of their position and the danger of negotiation is met with ridicule. They laugh at him and treat him as though he were crazy (Armstrong 242). His wife Maeg continues to argue with him that Canada will not go away and that his way will only cause more hardship, “strife and bitterness” for the people (243). She also continues to work with the “Constitution Express.” Her initial joy at their success in having aboriginal rights recognized later evaporates and she comes to share Tommy’s view with others. For him, the agreement promises a dark future, one with the Natives as “second class citizens instead of first class Indians” because without land they would be nothing.

Many of our leaders would be lining up to get compensation on their lands. That would be the worst devastation of all. Our rights would be empty words on paper that had no compassion for what is human on the land. I saw what money and power could do to our gentle people and I felt deep despair. Nothing much would remain after that to fight for. Nothing to heal our wounds in the fighting. We would no longer know freedom as a people. We would be in bondage to a society that neither loved us nor wanted us to be part of it. (Armstrong 248-49)

In this conclusion to the novel, in the chapter “We Are a People,” it is clear that no “resolution” has occurred between the antagonistic discursive formations of the opening chapters. No progress has been achieved in advancing the Native cause. Natives still remain divided within themselves and, more strategically, as this political novel demonstrates, among themselves. The most devastating impact of racism has been to divide Native peoples in order to assimilate them more easily. For the seeming opposition between white cultural codes and Native ones turns out to offer no choice at all. The choice to assimilate into progress or to fetishize tradition is ultimately the same choice: to remain caught in a binary antagonism between a hegemonic discourse and its inverse, a counter-hegemonic discourse. What Armstrong’s novel does, through the represented speech of Tommy, however, is to show the necessity for a third way, for a position of dis-identification where one may signify otherness yet refuse the trope of subordination.

There are all kinds of us from the Native Alliance for Red Power working on this. The Beothucks are a symbol to us. They were a tribe of Indians on the east coast that were wiped out so the land could be open for settlement. You see, there was a bounty placed on them by the government and they were hunted down to the last
one. That's how we fit into this society. They just want us out of the way, no matter how. It's called genocide. It's what's happening to our people right now. We are dying off because we can't fit in. Help is progressive. The ones that are just brown white men. The ones that fit in. Soon there will be no more true red men, with their own beliefs and ways. There is nothing wrong with our ways. Just because our people hate to be grabby, just because they don't knock themselves out like robots at nine-to-five jobs, and they don't get too excited about fancy stuff or what I call luxuries, they are looked down on and treated as outcasts and called lazy. Or else they get like us. They get angry inside and fight back somehow. Usually they end up dead, in prison or drunk. All of these lead to genocide of our people. You see they only give us two choices. Assimilate or get lost. A lot of us are lost. We need to make a third choice. That's what Red Patrol is about. (69-70)

Though Red Patrol is no longer an answer to the problem by the end of the novel, the necessity for a third position, one not established by the dominant discourse as its negation, is sited in a discourse of critique. Grounded in the interpretation of discourses, in the reading of codes, this hermeneutical activity is similar to the discourse of the analyst, attentive to desire in knowledge, the antithesis of the discourse of mastery. As such, it foregrounds the passionately engaged nature of knowledge, implicitly criticizing the totalizing Truth claims of the discourse of mastery. Critique as the terrain of resistance.

There is no “solution” to the political problem, no binding moment of illumination in this novel, only continual struggle to find a third position, constant questioning of assumptions. Similarly, there is no fictional closure, no re-solution, for the narrative circles around in its end to the beginning, that is, to the instance of enunciation where the narrator explains his need to tell his life story in order to provide a permanent record of the history of struggle. Whereas the Prologue opens with a focus on the act of narrating (“As I begin to write this story”) and on the narrative as feigning (“The characters in this novel are fictitious. . . . The events are based on actual events but are not meant to be portrayed as historically accurate [13]”), it ends with a poem, a lyric on the evanescence of nature, and so poses a problem in interpretation for the reader. Between historical fiction and the wind’s displacement of all signs, there has been no progress, no development and almost no action: the narrative is composed mainly of reported speech. In short, this has been a “flat” book not likely to make the best-seller list in Canada. Repetition is an important rhetorical feature in Native oral narrative. Indeed, a-chronological ordering of material is a characteristic feature of Native “autobiography.” But such repetition is routinely removed by white editors of such autobiographies to align them with the dominant codes of self-representation. The formal experimentation of Armstrong and Maracle with structures of chronology challenges the limitations of the generic codes of the white colonizer’s master historical narratives, not as formalist project, but to re-write the ending of the historical record. That the major challenge of the Native is to make the settler society understand that s/he has a history, that
Native culture has undergone development and change over time and is not "'primitive' and therefore without a 'history,' is necessary before Native culture can be perceived to have 'art history,'" and therefore be part of the movements in art that have produced "'high art.'" Similarly, the Native must challenge the codes of settler society to show that there is time, and consequently, meaning in her/his narratives. The fact that there is a Native history must be established in order to decentre the values of origin, primitivism, and mysticism that have configured the Native in the discourse of indigenization. "It is crucial," we have read in the opening lines, that the narrating "I am an Indian person" (13), crucial, we come to realize, because the cultural discourse legitimates fictional form.

Form, as Bakhtin has shown us, is always a message in a specific socio-historic configuration. Moreover, as he suggests, the inherited canons and modes of representation of the Western literary tradition do not permit an aesthetic based on performative values. Its high canonical genres are known "in their completed aspect" (Dialogic 3). The novel alone is developing in history. In this, it provides a critique of the fixity of genres by exposing the conventionality of their forms through parody. Slash re-accentuates the plot of growth and development characteristic of both the bildungsroman of the cultural hero and the histories of new nations ("Canada: the Building of a Nation"): both its lack of change and its palimpsestic mode are hidden polemics with the myth of progress, an implicit critique of this trope of imperialism.

But Armstrong's historical narrative challenges historiography on yet another ground, that of its truth claims. Knowledge is not Truth hidden in pre-existent facts to be discovered and reconstructed in language, but truth to be staged, constructed in the telling, "true simply as a consequence of being stated." The two types of truth, historical truth and narrative truth, are established on different grounds, in contrasting criteria of accuracy and adequacy, and deployed in different narrative modes, "plain" as contrasted to "significant." In the former, observation language, description, is important, for it enables the verification of the logical connection between events. In the latter, these connections are outwardly invisible, present as "narrative fit," that is, the narrative account seems to provide a coherent explanation of the events in question. Nothing relevant is omitted, everything irrelevant is excluded. The pieces fit into an "understandable Gestalt" (Spence 182). Narrative may be thought of as a kind of theory that "represents an interpretation of a particular meaning," a meaning "dependent on the observer's system of interpretation" (Spence 292). The problem of establishing general rules is great, for when interpretations are narrative rather than veridical, the hermeneut functions more as pattern maker than pattern finder (Spence 293). Interpretation is "crea-
"(Spence 177). As Maracle wrote about Native historiography as narrative: it is "re-writ[ing] history . . . re-writ[ing] her life onto the pages of a new history," This is the rebel "mak[ing] history" (Maracle 120-21).

Critical to this shift in frames of perspective in historiography is the narrative strategy of the fictionalized participant focalizer. For unlike the conventional historical narrative of knowledge as verifiable, pre-existent Truth, written from the distant, objectified position of a non-participant observer, both these narratives are the representations in quotation marks of political presentations by partisan narrators. The shift in frames of perception from outside to inside, from the eye to the I, inflects a disjunction in the relations of perception and representation, which establishes the grounds for this process of unfolding local stories, provisional truths. But such autobiographical narratives are a double challenge to discursive formations. As well as confronting and exposing the codes of settler historiography, these autobiographies break with the codes of Native "tradition." Autobiographies are "not a traditional form among Native peoples but the consequence of contact with the white invader-settlers, and the product of a limited collaboration with them." The first Native autobiographies were "told-to" narratives, the joint "collaboration" of an ethnographer or missionary and a Native. As such, their very textualization is a function of Euramerican pressure. They are, moreover, more properly "scientific" or "factual," than "literary," as is the case of autobiography in the canon of English literature. In this, they are the narrative of a "representative" of their culture, their story emphasizing the individual only in relation to her/his social roles, not as distinctive individual. The Native autobiography is consequently in its formation a double-voiced discourse, the collaboration of two persons of different cultures, modes of production and languages. In this, the Native autobiography is a heterogeneous, hybridized form. Consequently, it stands in opposition to the settler society with its literary norms of "ego-centric individualism, historicism, and writing" (Krupat 29). When the written autobiography is utilized by a living person to present her/his Native voice not as vanished and silent, but as living and able to articulate her/his differences, it presents itself as contradiction. Consequently, the autobiography holds potentials for challenging the discursive norms of the discourse on the indigene while dis/placing the fetishizing of Tradition.

For in the telling of an autobiographical narrative, a speaker posits herself/himself as the subject of a history, as the subject of a sentence, as "I." As Benveniste has shown, subjectivity is linguistically and discursively produced. "I," though, cannot be conceived without the conception of the "non-I," "you." Consciousness of self is possible only through contrast, through differentiation. Dialogue, the fundamental condition of language, implies a reversible polarity between "I" and "you" which are empty positions, shifters, marking the difference between now and then, here and there. "Language is possible only because each speaker sets himself [sic] as a subject by referring to himself as I in his discourse." But since language
is a system of differences with no positive terms, “I” designates only the subject of a specific utterance.

The basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language. “If one really thinks about it, one will see that there is no other objective testimony to the identity of the subject except that which he himself thus gives about himself” (Benveniste 226). Since language itself differentiates between concepts, offering the possibility of meaning, it is by adopting the position of subject within language that the individual is able to produce meaning. When learning to speak, one learns to differentiate between “I” and “you,” and to identify with the first-person subject-position. Subsequently, one learns to recognize oneself in a series of subject-positions (boy or girl, white or red, writer or reader, etc.), which are the positions from which discourse is intelligible to itself and others. Subjectivity is thus a matrix of subject-positions which may be inconsistent or even in contradiction with each other.

For this movement across the bar of language from signifier to signified occurs, as Lacan has shown, in the Imaginary, when the subject recognizes itself in a misrecognition of the self as other, in contradiction. By cross-identifying in this way with the Subject, the subject is constituted as subject in ideology, according to Althusser, positioned within the social discourses available to the subject. Given that the coherence of the sign and of the predicate synthesis are the guarantors of the unity of the speaking subject, as Kristeva argues, any attack against the sign—or syntax—is the mark of a re-evaluation process vis-à-vis the speaking subject’s unity.61 Writing history from the perspective of the subject in the process of making herself a subject through the constitution of an interlocutor, a community of readers, the “you” who bring her into being as subject, is to enact such a sign crime that destabilizes the unity of the subject of the dominant discourse of history, constructing a different subject of (hi)story, a critical subject, the Native storyteller as “storian.” Rather than offering a historical product, these fictions unfold an epistemological process, a way of knowing through telling and reading, and an existential process, a way of forming an identity through discourse.

It is through such strategies of dis/placement and decentring of available subject-positions that these two Native writers have challenged established canons of address and representation. Through their re-presentation of their political agenda as feminists and Natives, framed and staged as provisional narrative truths, Maracle and Armstrong have signified their otherness in the very act of refusing the trope of subordination. By locating interlocutors both within and without the Native community, by writing hybrid texts that address both audiences as “you,” they have constructed a complex subject-position for themselves, frequently contradictory, as Slash and Maracle’s narrator knows well, but one that allows for the creation of a third position, a transformative practice, one of analysis and critique of the dominant binary discourses on the indigene. They are self-consciously entering the dialogical fray surrounding the “silenced” subject of racism. Quite literally, Maracle...
and Armstrong are storytelling for their lives. To write the story that will be told over and over, to create that community of "yous" to respond to their narratives, this "writing re(a)d" will discursively constitute both themselves as authors and their critiques of racism as provisional truths. In this, they will have begun to write the other, otherwise. Other, that is, from the perspective of the dominant discourse within which I write.

NOTES

1 Thanks to Richard Dellamora and Julia Emberley for their dialogue on this question during the spring.


4 This play will receive full-scale production by Nightwood Theatre and Passe Muraille in the 1989-90 season.

5 There is promise of continuity too, with two projects underway to produce anthologies of Native women's writing, Sylvia Vance and Jeanne Perreault collecting for a NeWest collection (1990) as well as the Ts'eiku collective in Vancouver producing "Native Women: Celebrating Our Survival" with Press Gang.

6 I quote here from the posters and application forms for the series of workshops 14 January to 19 June 1989, Committee to Reestablish the Trickster, 9 St. Joseph Street, Toronto.

7 For a more detailed analysis of the Native copyright system where the right to tell a story is exchanged within a context of the acquisition of ritual knowledges, see my Talking About Ourselves: The Literary Productions of the Native Women of Canada (Ottawa: CRIAW, 1985).


9 Dominick LaCapra, History and Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 140.

10 Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 128. Representations, it should be remembered, are signs, a relationship of a signifier to a signifier within a system of differences, as Saussure formulated the process of signification. Meaning is produced in a network of differences not through reference to a "real Indian." As Peirce affirms, a sign can only be received by another sign, an interprétant, in a chain of semiosis.

11 The literary institution also offers many more subject-positions as reader, as teacher, as historian, etc. As well as the individual genres, texts offer different subject-positions for authors and readers.


Ann Wallace states that they were told the University of Toronto Press had too many accounts and would be adding no new presses. Subsequently, Second Story joined them.

II. J. Kirchhoff, “Writers reject bid to study plight of minorities in publishing,” The Globe and Mail, 30 May 1989, A19. This title in itself signals the slant of the article to the dominant group under the aegis of noblesse oblige.


To reproduce these jokes would be to reinscribe this racist discourse. The interested reader may find them in the newspaper.

Himani Bannerji, Prahaba Khosla, et al., “We Appear Silent to People Who Are Deaf to What We Say,” Fireweed, 16 (1983), 11.


As Saussure has shown, meaning and value are produced in a differential network of binary oppositions through the logical operations of selection and combination.


For further discussion of these archetypal patterns using Native Canadian material see the texts by Annis Pratt, “Affairs with Bears,” and by Gloria Orenstein, “Jovette Marchessault: The Ecstatic Vision-Quest of the New Feminist Shaman” in Gynocritics/Gynocritiques: Feminist Approaches to the Writing of Canadian and Quebec Women (Toronto: ECW, 1987).

For a fuller discussion of the clash between white and Native “images of the squaw” see my “Listening for the Silence: Native Women’s Traditional Narratives,” in The Native in Literature: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Thomas King, Helen Hoy and Cheryl Calver (Toronto: ECW, 1987), 133-73.

Fee, in King 24. For further analysis of the Native as sign of Canadian nationalism in the making, see my analysis of the search for a Canadian language as Anglo-Ojibwa in “The Oral Tradition and National Literatures,” Comparison, 12 (1981).


As Lacan outlines this discourse of mastery, it is the “tyranny of the all-knowing and exclusion of fantasy,” a discourse which “gives primacy to the signifier (S1), retreat of subjectivity beneath its bar (S), producing knowledge as object (S2), which stands over and against the lost object of desire (a),” Feminine Sexuality, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton, 1982), 161.


For a detailed examination of the predominance of models of the subjected subject see Paul Smith, Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).


Ironically, he describes these operations of exclusion within the dominant discourse of eurocentric racism: the place of disciplinary Truth is contrasted with the place of non-Truth, “une exteriorité sauvage” (Foucault, *Ordre* 37; my emphasis).


This concept has been used in Canadian political analysis to explore the inferior economic situation of Québécois and, more recently, as a model for the position of Native peoples in Canada in a state of "cultural siege." Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: the Case of Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2:3 (July 1979), 293-318.


Information on the history and practices of Theytus Books in Iris Loewen, "Native Publishing in Canada" (unpublished paper, 1987). For this and other relevant material, I thank Viola Thomas of Theytus Books.


As Lacan formulates it, the discourse of the analyst focuses on the question of desire, gives primacy to the object of desire (a), over and against knowledge as such (S2), which produces the subject in its division as the structure of fantasy (S), over the signifier through which it is constituted and from which it is divided (S1) (Lacan 161).


Donald P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 177.

